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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
________________ 
No. 12-1152 
 
________________ 
RONALD CASEY,  
 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
RIVERSIDE SCHOOL DISTRICT; MICHAEL DUDA; GEORGE BIEBER;  
CAROL ARMSTRONG 
 
 
________________ 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-10-cv-02385) 
District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo 
 
________________ 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 1, 2012 
 
 
Before: SLOVITER, AMBRO, and BARRY, 
 
Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  November 16, 2012) 
 
 
________________ 
OPINION 
 
________________ 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
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Casey began working for the Riverside School District
Ronald Casey brought discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act (PHRA). The District 
Court dismissed the suit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Casey filed a 
motion for reconsideration that the District Court denied because he failed to present 
“new evidence.” Casey attempted to appeal that decision.  However, the notice of appeal 
was not timely, and thus we do not have appellate jurisdiction. 
1
In November of 2010, Casey filed a complaint in District Court asserting 
discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII and the PHRA. The District filed a 
motion to dismiss, arguing that Casey failed to exhaust the necessary administrative 
remedies. At the time of the District’s motion, Casey had not received a right-to-sue letter 
from either the EEOC or the Pennsylvania Human Rights Commission (PHRC). As a 
result, the District Court entered an order on March 23, 2011, granting the  motion to 
dismiss. Casey then obtained a letter from the PHRC and filed a motion for 
reconsideration.  On December 8, 2011, the District Court denied Casey’s motion 
 as a buildings and grounds 
supervisor in 1996.  After he denied a request by the husband of the School Board 
President to have access to the Riverside School Field House for private use, Casey 
claims that members of the School Board began to harass him. During a leave of absence 
precipitated by the harassment, Casey contends that he filed a complaint with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) about the District’s conduct. 
                                              
1 The individual defendants include Riverside School District, Michael Duda, George 
Bieber, and Carol Armstrong. They are referred to collectively as the “District.” 
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because: (1) the PHRC letter was not new evidence, as Casey could have obtained it prior 
to the order granting the District’s motion to dismiss; and (2) the letter did not satisfy the 
exhaustion requirement because it states only that Casey tried to file a complaint with the 
PHRC, not that he actually filed one. Casey filed an appeal on January 12, 2012.  He 
argues that he provided the District Court with sufficient evidence to demonstrate that he 
pursued all administrative remedies afforded to him prior to filing a federal action, and 
that the District Court erred when it failed to accept a letter from the PHRC as adequate 
proof that he filed a PHRA claim (and therefore exhausted that administrative remedy).   
As a threshold matter, we are required to consider whether we have appellate 
jurisdiction before reaching the merits of an appeal.  Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. 
Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986), Elliott v. Archdiocese of N.Y., 682 F.3d 213, 219 (3d Cir. 
2012).  Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A), a notice of appeal 
must be filed “with the district clerk within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order 
appealed from.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). The District Court entered final judgment on 
Casey’s motion for reconsideration on December 8, 2011. He did not file his notice of 
appeal until January 12, 2012. We thus lack jurisdiction to address the merits of Casey’s 
appeal. See Browder v. Dir. of  Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (explaining that the time 
limit for filing a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional).  Accordingly, we must 
dismiss this appeal.2
                                              
2  Even if we had jurisdiction, we would have affirmed the District Court’s order on 
Casey’s motion for reconsideration, as he did not present new evidence in that motion or 
demonstrate that he exhausted administrative remedies before bringing this suit.  Burgh v. 
Borough Council of Borough of Montrose, 251 F.3d 465, 470 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 
